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Note
But Seriously, Folks: Toward a Coherent Standard
of Parody as Fair Use
Beth Warnken Van Hecke
INTRODUCTION
Parody1 is an ancient literary form with roots reaching
back to classical Greece.2 It is a satirical art in which the paro-
dist comments humorously and critically on an existing work
through an imitation that exposes the original's flaws. An ef-
1. Parody is defined as an "imitation of a work more or less closely mod-
elled on the original, but so turned as to produce a ridiculous effect." 11 Ox-
FORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 257 (2d ed. 1989). Literary critics and scholars
distinguish parody from the related forms of burlesque (which more broadly
caricatures the manner or spirit of serious works), satire (which holds up to
ridicule or derision the vices or shortcomings of an individual or an institu-
tion), travesty, pastiche, and irony. See MARGARET A. ROSE, PARODY//MErA-
FICTION: AN ANALYSIS OF PARODY AS A CRITICAL MIRROR TO THE WRITING
AND RECEPTION OF FICTION 39-55 (1979); Leon R. Yankwich, Parody and Bur-
lesque in the Law of Copyright, 33 CAN. B. RE,. 1130, 1131 (1955). Scholars
consider parody the highest of these forms because, at its best, it cleverly imi-
tates a work, thereby calling attention to the original's flaws. PRINCETON EN-
CYCLOPEDIA OF POETRY AND POETICS 601 (Alex Preminger ed., 1974) ("The
best parody surpasses mere imitation."); ROSE, supra, at 45. Following the
practice of courts and most commentators, this note will use the term parody
to describe all of these forms.
2. The most famous ancient parodist is probably Aristophanes, whose
play The Frogs parodies the verse of rival playwright Euripides. ROSE, supra
note 1, at 18-19. Cervantes's Don Quixote and Chaucer's "The Rhyme of Sir
Thopas" from Canterbury Tales are two well-known works that parody medie-
val chivalric tales. Shakespeare in A Midsummer Night's Dream, Swift in
Gulliver's Travels, Pope in The Rape of the Lock and Fielding in Shamela all
parodied works of their day. Well-known American parodists include Beer-
bohm and Thurber. As this brief survey indicates, parody can rise to the level
of the best literature, at times outliving the works it parodies. For a historical
discussion of parody see PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POETRY AND POETICS,
supra note 1, at 601-02; Charles C. Goetsch, Parody as Free Speech.- The Re-
placement of Fair Use by First Amendment Protection, 3 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
39, 40-41 (1980); Yankwich, supra note 1, at 1133-37. See generally 1 WALTER
HAMILTON, PARODIES OF THE WORKS OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN AUTHORS
(1884); DWIGHT MACDONALD, PARODIES: AN ANTHOLOGY FROM CHAUCER TO
BEERBOHM-AND AFTER (1985).
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fective parody requires the audience recognize both the subject
of the parody and the parodist's mocking distortions. To
achieve this, a parodist often must mirror or directly copy por-
tions of the original.3
When a parodist imitates4 a copyrighted work, however,
she may run afoul of copyright law, which grants authors5 con-
trol over duplication, performance and distribution of their cre-
ations.6 Moreover, because parody ridicules its subject, often
harshly, an irate author may bring an infringement suit to
soothe her wounded pride.
At times, courts excuse otherwise-infringing parodies
under the doctrine of "fair use"; but their inconsistent decisions
make the line separating "fair" parodies from infringing ones
difficult, if not impossible, to draw. As a result, parodists may
be unsure about what they safely may borrow. This confusion
chills parodists' art and stifles the creativity copyright is meant
to encourage.
This Note proposes a framework for analyzing parody
cases. Part I describes the theoretical basis for copyright and
the fair use doctrine and examines two recent Supreme Court
decisions involving fair use. Part II examines the case law con-
cerning parodies. Part III suggests that courts evaluate parody
cases by examining the alleged infringement in terms of the
purpose behind copyright, focusing largely on whether the par-
ody is capable of serving as a substitute for the original.
3. This is the central feature of parody. If the reader does not recognize
the original work, parody's function--critical commentary through imitation-
and its unique societal value are lost.
4. This imitation can take two different forms. Without plagiarizing the
work, a parodist may either appropriate the actual words of a text or lyrics or
else appropriate the structure or general expression of the original. See 3
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01[B]
(1992).
5. This Note will use the terms "author" and "copyright holder" inter-
changeably, although the creator of a work may, of course, transfer the copy-
right to another.
6. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
A parodist is free to seek permission to use a work. Because parody is
often critical of its subject, however, authors are unlikely to grant permission.
See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Parodists will seldom get
permission from those whose works are parodied. Self-esteem is seldom
strong enough to permit the granting of permission even in exchange for a
reasonable fee."); Harriette K. Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of
Libel, Trademark and Copyright Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U. L. REV.
923, 960 (1985); Note, Parody Defense to Copyright Infringement: Productive
Fair Use After Betamax, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1395, 1397 (1984).
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I. COPYRIGHT AND FAIR USE
A. THE MECHANICS OF COPYRIGHT LAW
The Constitution authorizes Congress to "promote the Pro-
gress" of literature and the arts "by securing for limited Times
to Authors... the exclusive Right to their... Writings. '7 At
first limited to books, maps and charts, copyright protection
now extends to original works fixed in any "tangible medium
of expression" from the moment of creation." An author has a
limited monopoly to sell, reproduce, perform and create deriva-
tive works based on the original.9 To preserve the monopoly,
an author may sue to enjoin infringing uses or may bring an ac-
tion for damages. 10
B. THE UTILITARIAN NATURE OF COPYRIGHT
Copyright helps to ensure authors a fair return for their la-
bors, but this is not its primary goal. The Supreme Court has
long acknowledged that copyright, a wholly statutory crea-
tion,11 exists because of its social utility.12 Thus, granting pro-
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Congress passed the first copyright act in
1790. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed). It was based on the
original British copyright act. An Act for the Encouragement of Learning,
1709, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (Eng.). For information on the history of British and
American copyright law, see BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF
COPYRIGHT 1-26 (1967).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). The Copyright Law has undergone four major
revisions, each expanding the scope of protection. The most recent substantive
revision occurred in 1976. The Act now covers musical and dramatic composi-
tions, photos and negatives, and fine arts.
9. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
10. 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-511 (1988). Anyone who violates the rights reserved
to the copyright holder infringes upon the copyright. § 501. The copyright
holder faced with an infringing use has several options. First, she may seek an
injunction preventing the use. § 502. Second, she may sue to recover damages
and any profits of the infringer. § 504. Third, she may opt for statutory dam-
ages. § 504(c). Finally, if the infringement involves copies or recordings, she
may ask the court to impound and destroy the offending items. § 503. If the
infringement is willful, criminal sanctions may ensue. § 506.
11. It is well settled that copyright is wholly statutory. See Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984) (citing Wheaton v. Pe-
ters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 661-62 (1834)).
12. See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545
(1985) (stating that "copyright is intended to increase and not to impede the
harvest of knowledge"); Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429 ("[Ihe limited grant is a
means by which an important public purpose may be achieved."); Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("[P]rivate motivation
must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of liter-
ature, music and the other arts."); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)
("The economic philosophy behind ... copyrights is the conviction that en-
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prietary13 rights to authors will result in general benefits to
society, by encouraging and increasing public dissemination of
informative and creative works.14
Absolute protection for every original work, however,
would decrease, rather than increase, the free flow of knowl-
edge. Because every idea is to some extent derivative, such pro-
tection would lead to duplication of effort, impeding scientific
and artistic progress.' 5 To mitigate such evils, the Copyright
Law limits an owner's control over her work in several signifi-
cant ways. First, copyright protection exists only for a limited
period of time.16 Second, protection extends only to the "ex-
pression" of the ideas embodied in a work; anyone may use the
couragment of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors.. . ."); United
States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (stating that "copyright
law . . . makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration"); Fox Film
Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ("The sole interest of the United States
and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits
derived by the public from the labors of authors.").
13. A copyright is a property right. Because a copyright is intellectual
property rather than tangible property, however, anyone can use the copy-
righted work without loss of any of the work's intrinsic value. Use by others,
however, may preclude the copyright owner from profitting from expanded
use of the work. For example, an infringer who adapts a novel into a motion
picture deprives the author of a substantial benefit from the work. The novel
itself loses no value, but the author has lost the option of adapting it herself.
See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 290 (1970);
Sheldon N. Light, Parody, Burlesque, and the Economic Rationale for Copy-
right, 11 CONN. L. REV. 615, 618 (1979).
14. In this sense copyright is related to the First Amendment. While it
often has been argued that the First Amendment precludes application of
copyright law when the free flow of ideas would be impeded, only one court
has accepted this argument. Triangle Publications v. Knight-Ridder Newspa-
pers, 445 F. Supp. 875, 881-84 (S.D. Fla. 1978), aff'd on other grounds, 626 F.2d
1171 (5th Cir. 1980). Several other cases have implicitly weighed First Amend-
ment considerations in determining fair use. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Bernard
Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
15. By refusing to authorize use of the ideas in her work, for example, an
author could deny scholars the building blocks of their disciplines. See
Zachariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REV.
503, 511 (1945); see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 582 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
16. 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-305 (1988). For works created on or after January 1,
1978, and works created but not published or copyrighted before that date,
copyright generally extends for the author's life plus 50 years. §§ 302-303.
This is the longest period of protection Congress has granted. Works copy-
righted before January 1, 1978, generally are protected for twenty-eight years
beyond the copyright date. § 304.
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ideas.1 7 Third, infringement requires substantial similarity be-
tween the original and the allegedly infringing work;' s negligi-
ble copying is not actionable.' 9 Fourth, copyright does not
protect the integrity of the creation or of the author as crea-
tor.20 Finally, the doctrine of fair use excuses infringing uses of
17. The idea/expression dichotomy is best expressed in Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954). See also Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d
119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
A corollary to the idea/expression dichotomy is that works that are com-
pletely utilitarian in function cannot be copyrighted. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 215-16;
Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 801-04 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 908 (1979).
18. The issue of whether the allegedly infringing work is substantially
similar to the original is often a perplexing one, particularly when there has
been no literal copying. Courts have developed a variety of tests to define sub-
stantial similarity. See Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121-22 (presenting Judge Learned
Hand's well known "abstractions" test); Mazer, 347 U.S. at 271 (discussing the
idea/expression dichotomy); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDon-
ald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977) (judging infringement by "total
concept and feel").
19. Courts refer to negligible copying as "de minimus," a term of art
describing a taking so small that an average person would not recognize the
appropriation. See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434-35 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986); El-
smere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 744
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980).
20. With the limited exception of the visual arts, American copyright law
does not vindicate the so-called "moral rights" (droits moral) of an author.
The moral rights theory of copyright has two major components. First, a liter-
ary or artistic creation is the property of the creator and natural law dictates
that no one should be permitted to use the work without the author's ap-
proval. See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doc-
trine, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1137, 1138 (1990) (citing JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES
OF GOVERNMENT 311 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d prtg. 1963) (3d ed. 1698)). Second,
the author as creator should have the right to prevent her work from being
disparaged or deformed by use, or attributed to another. The author also
should be permitted the privilege of preventing distribution of her work. See
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988) (granting limited rights-subject to fair use-to visual
artists during their lifetimes); 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 8.21[A];
Breyer, supra note 13, at 289-90 (citing 1 IMMANUEL KANT, Of the Unjustice of
Counterfeiting Books, in ESSAYS AND TREATISES ON MORAL, POLICAL, AND
VARious PHILosOPHIcAL SuBJECrs 225, 229-30 (W. Richardson trans., 1798)).
Because its function is to preserve economic incentives, the Copyright
Law does not protect an author's moral rights. But cf. Note, An Author's Ar-
tistic Reputation Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1490, 1515
(1979) (inferring limited moral rights under the Copyright Law). Despite the
absence of any such protection, however, the outcome of many parody cases
most logically can be explained as a vindication of the plaintiff's moral rights.
See 2 NImmER & NIM:MER, supra note 4, § 8.21[B] (noting that an increasing
number of cases seem to vindicate moral rights under copyright law and other
causes of action). For example, courts often protect an author against parodies
that are detrimental to the author's reputation, or which deform the original
in some way that the plaintiff (and often the court) finds distasteful. See DC
Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Business, 598 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1984);
1992]
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a copyrighted work that do not subvert the aim of copyright.
B. THE FAIR USE DocTRINE
The fair use doctrine, called "the most troublesome [issue]
in the whole law of copyright,"'21 allows a court to excuse a use
that technically infringes upon the owner's copyright if the use
is socially beneficial.22 The Copyright Law does not define fair
use.23 The Law does, however, list several socially valuable cat-
egories of use that are presumptively fair, including criticism,
comment, teaching and research.2 4 It then directs courts to
Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1132 (1979); Walt Disney Prods. v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp.
1397 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). But see Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp.
1150, 1158 (M.D. Tenn. 1991) (rejecting the argument that off-color parody of
the song "Oh Pretty Woman" "tarnished" the plaintiff's copyright); Pillsbury
Co. v. Milky Way Prods., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (finding an
obscene parody fair use).
21. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939). Courts
also have complained that fair use is "so flexible as virtually to defy defini-
tion." Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); see also Weinreb, supra note 20, at 1137.
22. Because it is an affirmative defense, a court need only consider a claim
of fair use if all the requirements for infringement have been met. 3 NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra note 4, at § 13.05. Fair use is a mixed question of fact and
law. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
Fair use is based on the British common law doctrine of fair dealing. The
first widely-used American statement of fair use appeared in Folsom v. Marsh,
9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901), in which Justice Story explained
that fair use "depend[s] upon a nice balance of the comparative use made in
one of the materials of the other," including the "nature, extent, and value" of
the materials used. Id at 344. For the development of the fair dealing and
fair use doctrines see KAPLAN, supra note 7, at 25-37.
Congress first codified fair use in 1976. Desiring that it be adaptable in a
time of "rapid technological change," Congress restated the common law fair
use doctrine, emphasizing that codification was not intended to "change, nar-
row or enlarge" it in any way. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-66
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680.
23. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
The statute provides little assistance in demarcating the fair use doctrine.
Moreover, there is little judicial consensus concerning fair use. It has been al-
ternatively defined as de minimus taking, Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publications,
Inc., 246 F.2d 598, 603-04 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957); as
privileged use of copyrighted materials that is "reasonable," H. BALL, LAW OF
COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944); and as a way to prevent rigid,
information-depriving applications of copyright law, Consumers Union of U.S.
v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 823 (1984). Perhaps the best way to describe fair use is as an infringing
use that is excused because it furthers the aims of copyright law.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
Courts hold that parody is not a presumptively fair use. Fisher v. Dees,
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consider four unweighted factors to determine whether the
questioned use of a copyrighted work is fair: the purpose and
character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the
amount copied, and the economic effect of the copying.25
The first factor, the purpose and character of the use, con-
cerns whether the use is for nonprofit, educational purposes.26
Because the fair use doctrine protects socially beneficial uses,
such appropriations are presumptively fair.27 Under this factor,
courts may also consider the nature of the parodist's conduct,
including whether she acted in good faith.28
The second factor is the nature of the copyrighted work.29
Because copyright exists to increase the flow of knowledge,
courts under the fair use doctrine may treat the appropriation
of factual works more leniently than the appropriation of crea-
tive works.30
The third factor, the amount and substantiality of the por-
tion used,31 requires comparison with the copyrighted work as a
whole. Courts consider the substantiality of the taking qualita-
tively as well as quantitatively. If a parodist appropriates the
"heart" of a work, even if she uses only a small fraction of the
original, the fair use defense may fail.32  Finally, and most
794 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1986). Because parody comments both humorously
and caustically on the original work, however, it could logically fit either in
the presumptively fair criticism or comment categories. The legislative history
of § 107 indicates that Congress considered parody as an example of a possible
fair use. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 22, at 65, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5678.
25. 17 U.S.C. § 107. The statute states that the factors for consideration
"shall include" the four listed, leaving open the possibility of more factors for
consideration. § 107 (emphasis added). This is consistent with congressional
intent to restate fair use, not to define it. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 22, at
66, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5680. Courts thus are free to consider
other unnamed factors or even to eliminate the statutory framework alto-
gether. The judiciary's continued reliance on the traditional four-prong fair
use test, however, indicates reluctance to stray from the dictates of § 107.
26. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
27. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 465 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
28. 3 NMIsER & Naamp, supra note 4, at § 13.05[A].
29. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
30. This factor tends to weigh against parodies because they are usually
directed at creative works. Because most parodies are themselves creative
works, however, courts often treat this factor neutrally; the nature of the par-
ody and of the original cancel each other out. See, e.g., Eveready Battery Co. v.
Adolph Coors Co., 765 F. Supp. 440, 447 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
31. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
32. See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985),
in which the Supreme Court held that use of approximately 300 words from a
200,000 word manuscript infringed the owner's copyright. But compare Sony
1992]
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importantly, the fourth factor directs courts to consider the ef-
fect of the use upon the "potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. ' 33 As "the single most important element"
in fair use,34 market effect receives considerable judicial
scrutiny.
Because the purpose of copyright is to provide authors with
economic incentives to disseminate their works, courts' analyti-
cal focal point should be whether an unauthorized use is a dis-
incentive to dissemination.3 5 Nonetheless, application of the
fair use doctrine is inconsistent, often hinging on some unstated
calculus of the equities. Thus, despite judicial recognition of
copyright's social function, fair use analysis remains
unpredictable.
C. RECENT SUPREME COURT RULINGS ON FAIR USE
Twice within the last decade the Supreme Court examined
the fair use doctrine as codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107. Neither of
these cases concerned parodies; nonetheless, these decisions in-
dicate the Supreme Court's approaches toward fair use and sug-
gest methods for analyzing parody.
These two cases exemplify the Court's inconsistent ap-
proach to fair use.36  In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc.,37 the Court strongly endorsed a utilitarian
theory of copyright, emphasizing that economic harm to the
copyright holder should be the primary fair use test. Sony in-
volved time-shifting-videotaping television programs for later,
private viewing-which the Court held to be fair use.38 Expres-
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) and Williams &
Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), qff'd by an equally
divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975), in which each court held that total appro-
priation of copyrighted works was fair use.
33. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
34. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566.
35. Because copyright exists to encourage authors to disseminate their
work, there is no reason to penalize a use which does not harm the copyright
holder.
36. Commentators have criticized Sony and Harper & Row. See William
W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661
passim (1988); Weinreb, supra note 20, at 1158.
37. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
38. Id. at 456. In Sony, Walt Disney Studios and other copyright owners
brought suit against Sony, the manufacturer of Betamax home-videotaping
machines, alleging contributory copyright infringement. Id. at 420. To deter-
mine whether Sony was liable for the actions of Betamax purchasers, the
Court examined whether consumer uses of Betamax infringed upon the plain-
tiffs' copyrights. Id. at 434. Because it characterized time-shifting as a fair use,
[Vol. 77:465
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sing the statutory fair use factors as a balancing test, the Court
weighed the social value of time-shifting against the harm it
caused. It noted that Betamax purchasers recorded programs
to watch at home, a non-commercial use militating against a
finding of infringement.39 In addition, the Court noted that
Universal City Studios could not demonstrate convincingly that
home recording caused significant economic harm,40 and it
identified a host of socially valuable uses for time-shifting.4
1
In Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises,4 the
Court again emphasized the utilitarian nature of copyright and
the importance of the economic harm prong of the fair use test.
In finding Nation's use not to be fair, however, it focused pri-
marily on the qualitative significance of the excerpts copied and
Nation's bad faith in "knowingly exploit[ing] a purloined manu-
script. ' 43 Citing 17 U.S.C. § 107, the Court stressed that the
commercial nature of a use is significant. It defined commer-
cial use, however, not as financially motivated appropriation, as
had the Sony court, but as a taking in which "the user stands to
profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without
paying the customary price."44  This broad definition of com-
merciality, if applied to parody, which has an element of ex-
pression akin to that the First Amendment protects, could have
startling ramifications.
Sony and Harper & Row demonstrate the difficulty courts
encounter when evaluating fair use claims. A review of parody
the Court found no contributory infringement. Id. at 456. In holding that
time-shifting was fair use, the Court explicitly rejected the long-held assump-
tion that a use must be "productive," or involve some secondary creative ef-
fort, to be fair. Id. at 455 nA0.
39. Id at 449. The majority emphasized the non-commercial nature of
time-shifting, mentioning that studies had shown that people who tape pro-
grams intend to watch them privately at their own convenience. The Court
stated that "every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an
unfair exploitation" of the owner's copyright. Id. at 451. While this is logical
in normal business settings, where competition between the copyright holder
and the alleged infringer is likely to exist, presumptions of infringement in
commercially-marketed parodies are inappropriate. See infra Part III.C.2.
40. Sony, 464 U.S. at 451-54.
41. Id. at 444-46. Commentators have criticized the quality of the Court's
balancing and analysis. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, may have
underestimated the possibility of market harm. See Weinreb, supra note 20, at
1154-55.
42. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). Harper & Row arose out of the unauthorized pub-
lication by the Nation magazine of excerpts from President Gerald Ford's
memoirs.
43. Id. at 562-63.
44. Id at 562.
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cases from lower courts reveals that while courts recognize that
parody's special nature requires some accommodation to thrive,
courts also face difficulties in evaluating parodists' fair use
claims.
II. THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF PARODY
Much of the confusion regarding parody cases is the result
of courts' inconsistent approaches in fair use cases. Judicial
analyses of the parody defense are often conclusory, serving
merely to confirm decisions judges had already instinctively
reached. As a result, the parody defense has careened from
one dispositive factor to another, leaving the courts, commenta-
tors and, presumably, would-be parodists, in considerable
confusion.45
Three major problems underlie present judicial approaches
45. There has been much comment about the tension between parody and
copyright law. Two of the earliest parody cases, Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd sub nom., Benny
v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd per curiam by an equally di-
vided Court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958), and Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National
Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955), resulted in a flurry of legal
scholarship. See Victor S. Netterville, Copyright and Tort Aspects of Parody,
Mimicry and Humorous Commentary, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 225 (1962) (arguing
tort and copyright law should provide particular freedom to parodists and hu-
morists); Arthur Rossett, Burlesque as Copyright Infringement, 9 COPYRIGHT
L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1 (1958) (advocating taking the speed of technological ad-
vancement into account in applying copyright principles); Herman F. Selvin,
Parody and Burlesque of Copyrighted Works as Infringement, 6 BULL. Copy.
RIGHT Soc. 53 (1958) (distinguishing creative, artful parody from "carbon copy"
parody for purpose of fair use); Yankwich, supra note 1; Note, 56 CoLUM. L.
REV. 585 (1956) (proposing test for "fair use" based on promotion of progress
in the arts); David M. Dixon, Note, Parody and Burlesque-Fair Use or Copy-
right Infringement?, 12 VAND. L. REV. 459 (1959) (calling for expansion of fair
use to include parody and burlesque); Gerald A. Gafford, Comment, Substan-
tial Borrowing v. Fair Use, or Spoof with Caution, 30 MIss. L. J. 175 (1959)
(advocating purpose of use as the focus of analysis); Ashley German, Com-
ment, Parody of Copyrighted Works: Death of an Art Form?, 4 WAYNE L. REV.
49 (1957) (criticizing then existing law as providing no clear standard for art-
ists); Samuel C. McClaren, Comment, Copyright: Burlesque and the Doctrine
of Fair Use, 12 OKLA. L. REV. 276 (1959) (arguing that intent of parodist
should factor into analysis); Norman H. McNeil, Note, Burlesque of Literary
Property as Infringement of Copyright, 31 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 46 (1955) (rec-
ommending legal protection for owners of material parodied); Comment, 31
N.Y.U. L. REV. 606 (1956) (arguing that the focus of judicial inquiry should be
whether the parody replaces the original); Comment, Parody and the Law of
Copyright, 29 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 570 (1961) (agreeing with the holding in
Loew's); Note, 28 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 134 (1955) (upholding Loew's as a move-
ment in the right direction); Decision, 10 Sw. L.J. 68 (1956) (suggesting that
the commercial motive of the parody be the focus of judicial inquiry); William
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to parody. First, courts pay excessive attention to the substan-
tiality of the parodist's taking, without considering whether it
caused the author any significant economic harm.46 Second,
courts, with little concrete analysis, often deny the fair use de-
fense where they deem the parody "commercial. ' '47 Finally,
J. Wise, Recent Decision, 56 MICH. L. REv. 1355 (1958) (arguing parody de-
serves more protection than was accorded by Loew's).
Subsequent cases renewed commentators' interest. See Robert D. Hadl,
Parody Lyrics-The "Mad" Magazine Case, 11 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc. 319
(1964) (supporting stronger protection for copyright owners); John Mummery,
Parody and Plagiarism, 116 NEw L.J. 1651 (1966) (proposing defense of fair
dealing for the purpose of parody); Raymond T. Nimmer, The Law of Par-
ody-Infringement, 3 VAL. U. L. REv. 34 (1968) (advocating case-by-case ap-
proach); Comment, A Copyright Quandary: Parody, Burlesque and the Fair
Use Doctrine, 29 ALB. L. REV. 312 (1965) (arguing that parodist infringes only
when using substantial part of original not incidental to parody); Thomas P.
Demeter, Note, Legal Perils of Parody and Burlesque, 17 CLEV.-MAISHALL L.
REV. 242 (1968) (agreeing with Columbia Pictures in protecting parody as a
valid art form); William C. Nugent II, Comment, Parody or Piracy: Never the
Twain, 38 U. COLO. L. REV. 550 (1966) (suggesting a need for greater freedom
for parodists).
Recent attempts to resolve the tension between parody and copyright law
fall into three rough categories. Some commentators have advocated applying
the First Amendment to parodies. Goetsch, supra note 2; Kevin W. Wheel-
wright, Note, Parody, Copyrights and the First Amendment, 10 U.S.F. L. REV.
564 (1976); see also Dorsen, supra note 6, at 923 (criticizing courts for creating
an unacknowledged tort of "satiric appropriation" at the expense of First
Amendment freedom).
Other commentators have attempted to develop a legal definition of par-
ody. See Richard A. Bernstein, Parody and Fair Use in Copyright Law, 31
COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1 (1984) (arguing that the social value of the
parody should be measured against the original in determining whether the
parody promotes "the progress of the arts"); Julie Bisceglia, Parody and Copy-
right Protection: Turning the Balancing Act into a Juggling Act, 34 CoPy-
RIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1 (1987) (asserting that a satire must comment on
the source text to meet the proposed legal definition of parody); Melanie A.
Clemmons, Author v. Parodist: Striking a Compromise, 33 COPYRIGHT L.
SYMP. (ASCAP) 85 (1987) (advocating requirement that the parodist's efforts
be independent and recognizable); Susan L. Faaland, Comment, Parody and
Fair Use: The Critical Question, 57 WASH. L. REv. 163 (1981) (arguing that
parody is fair use if it comments critically upon the original work).
Finally, and with greater success, commentators have evaluated the par-
ody defense in terms of economic theory. See Sheldon N. Light, Parody, Bur-
lesque, and the Economic Rationale for Copyright, 11 CONN. L. REv. 615 (1979)
(proposing test of whether the parody interferes with the copyright owner's
market interests); Alfred C. Yen, When Authors Won't Sell Parody, Fair Use
and Efficiency in Copyright Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 79 (1991) (arguing that
an economically rational behavioral model collapses when authors are con-
fronted by parodies of their works); Note, The Parody Defense to Copyright In-
fringement. Productive Fair Use After Betamax, supra note 6 (examining
parody and fair use in light of the Sony decision).
46. See infra Parts II.A, III.A.
47. See infra Part II.B.
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and most disturbingly, many cases turn on factors outside the
scope of copyright, such as the distasteful nature of the parody
and its negative effect on the copyright holder's reputation.48
A. THE SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE TAKING: "CONJURING UP"
THE ORIGINAL
Much of the case law concerning parody focuses on the
third prong of the fair use test, the amount and substantiality
of the use.4 9 Courts have applied various standards to deter-
mine when a parodist has copied "too much" of the original.
Recognizing that parody requires some copying, courts attempt
to balance the competing interests of parodist and copyright
holder.50 Unfortunately, they fail to consider the substantiality
of the use in terms of copyright's underlying social purpose.
Focusing on whether the amount taken is "too much," an im-
precise assessment at best, distracts courts from the real issue
of fair use: whether a particular use undermines the copyright
incentive system by harming the author.
1. "Conjuring Up" the Original
In one of the earliest parody cases,51 Loew's, Inc. v. Colum-
bia Broadcasting System,52 the court flatly rejected the sugges-
tion that parody requires any accommodation under the fair use
doctrine.53 Denying comedian Jack Benny the fair use de-
fense,5 the district court held that Benny's satire of the movie
48. See infra Part H.C.
49. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
50. Although some commentators suggest otherwise, authors and paro-
dists have diverging interests. The parodist is concerned with achieving the
greatest possible freedom in which to practice her art. Authors want to con-
trol use of their creation, both to maximize profits and to protect the integrity
of their work. But see Clemmons, supra note 45, at 93 (arguing that it is incor-
rect to characterize authors' and parodists' interests as competing).
51. Several cases in the early years of this century involved parody or
mimicry of performers. See Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359
(S.D.N.Y. 1914); Green v. Luby, 177 F. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1909); Green v. Minzen-
sheimer, 177 F. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1909); Bloom & Hamlin v. Nixon, 125 F. 977
(E.D. Pa. 1903); see also Leo Feist, Inc. v. Song Parodies, Inc., 146 F.2d 400 (2d
Cir. 1944) (song parodies).
52. 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's, Inc.,
239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 356
U.S. 43 (1958).
53. 131 F. Supp. at 177. The trial court insisted that a "parodized or bur-
lesque taking is treated no differently from any other appropriation." Id. at
183. In its decision on the appeal, the Ninth Circuit quoted this language with
approval. 239 F.2d at 537.
54. 131 F. Supp. at 183. The court found that Benny's skit, entitled
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Gaslight infringed upon the original's copyright. In affirming
the district court's holding, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected the defendant's contention that "Autolight" was a crit-
icism of the movie.55
Since Loew's, courts uniformly have recognized that the
unique, imitative nature of parody minimally requires leeway
in recalling the original work. Several months after its deci-
sion, the Loew's district court, in Columbia Pictures Corp. v.
National Broadcasting Co., retreated from its earlier position.5 6
Allowing as fair use a From Here to Eternity satire performed
on Sid Caesar's Your Show of Shows, the court acknowledged
that parody requires "[s]ome limited taking. ' 57 Parody, the
court held, is fair use if it appropriates no more than necessary
to "conjure up" the original.58
"Autolight," tracked the plot, main characters and locale of Gaslight, and that
the two works were nearly identical "except that [Benny's] treatment is bur-
lesque." IH. at 170-71. Curiously, the district court mentioned that
"Autolight" was 15 minutes long, id. at 169, while the court of appeals de-
scribes the skit as a half-hour long. 239 F.2d at 533. Gaslight was a full length
movie. Even if one assumes "Autolight" was in fact a half-hour long, it is diffi-
cult to imagine how the works accurately can be described as "identical."
After finding Benny's taking to be substantial, the court considered the
substantiality of taking in determining whether the use was of the non-action-
able de minimus variety-but mistakenly confused this analysis with the sub-
stantiality prong of the fair use test. 131 F. Supp. at 170-83. By confusing
these two issues, the court in effect collapsed them into one. Therefore, under
the reasoning of Loew's, a substantial taking precludes any finding of fair use.
The Ninth Circuit explicitly repudiated this reasoning in Walt Disney Produc-
tions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 757 (9th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1132
(1979).
55. 239 F.2d at 537. Many commentators have criticized the trial and ap-
pellate court decisions in Loewb. See Dixon, supra note 45, at 476-81; Note,
Parody and Copyright I7fingement, supra note 45, at 600-04; see also
KAPLAN, supra note 7, at 69 (suggesting the Loew's decision is unconstitu-
tional). But see Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural
and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLuM.
L. REV. 1600, 1640 n.221 (suggesting Loew's was properly decided).
56. 37 F. Supp. 348, 350-51 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
57. Id. at 350.
58. Id. at 351, 354. "From Here to Obscurity," the skit at issue in Colum-
bia Pictures, was twenty minutes long. Id. at 352. The original was, as in
Loew's, a full length film. This suggests that the substantiality of the taking,
the purported distinguishable element in these two cases, really obscures the
court's evaluation of several different factors. Although the infringement al-
leged in Loewb was the one-time broadcast of "Autolight," Loew's sued in re-
sponse to Benny's plans to create a half-hour TV movie of the parody. 131 F.
Supp. at 169. Thus the court may have been responding to Benny's future use
of Gaslight as well as his past use. Alternatively, it may have responded to the
fact that Benny's skit gave away the original's dramatic surprise ending.
Several commentators have suggested that Loew's and Columbia Pictures
1992]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Responding to 1964's Berlin v. E.C Publications,59 a copy-
right infringement suit leveled against Mad Magazine for pub-
lishing lyrics parodying well-known songs by Irving Berlin,60
the Second Circuit adopted the Columbia Pictures conjure up
test. Noting the parody copied only a few stray lines, the court
held that the works were not substantially similar.61 Although
it found the taking insubstantial, and thus non-infringing, the
court nevertheless formulated in dictum its own rule regarding
parody, combining economic analysis with the Columbia Pic-
tures conjure up standard. A parody is fair use, the court
stated, when it does not fulfill demand for the original and
takes no more than necessary to conjure up the original. 6
2. The Conjure Up Test Today
Two recent circuit court decisions demonstrate both the
progress courts have made in dealing with the parody defense
and their continued reliance on the conjure up test. In Elsmere
were judicial attempts to regulate competition between the young television
industry and the motion picture business. See, e.g., Netterville, supra note 45,
at 233.
59. 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964), affg 219 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) cert
denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964).
60. Id. at 542-43. Mad Magazine's 25 Berlin parodies included "I Swat You
on the Skin," a lampoon about fraternity hazing sung to the tune of "I've Got
You Under My Skin," and "Louella Schwartz Describes Her Malady," about a
talkative hypochondriac, sung to "A Pretty Girl Is Like a Melody." 219 F.
Supp. at 912.
61. 329 F.2d at 545. Because the court concluded that the works were not
substantially similar, it did not reach the issue of whether the parodies were
fair use. The court, however, discussed the issue of parodies at length. Detail-
ing the avalanche of criticism aimed at the Loews decision, it underscored its
own opposition to that approach by declaring that "parody and satire are de-
serving of substantial freedom-both as entertainment and as a form of social
and literary criticism." Id.
62. Id Significantly, the Berlin court explicitly focused for the first time
on whether the use affected the value of the copyright, noting Berlin's inabil-
ity to point "with any degree of particularity" to economic harm the parodies
caused. Id. at 543.
The court's standard, whether the parody fulfills demand for the original,
potentially is a high one for plaintiffs to meet. The Berlin court emphasized
that the plaintiffs made no claim of market replacement. This suggests, how-
ever, that the requirement might have been satisfied if Berlin had made even
a meager showing that the parody fulfilled demand for the original.
If Mad Magazine had included song sheets with its satirical lyrics the Ber-
lin court may have reversed its decision. Cf Leo Feist v. Song Parodies, Inc.,
146 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1944) (finding an infringement where a book of song par-
odies included lyrics and sheet music). The district court in Berlin noted the
earlier case with approval. 219 F. Supp. at 914.
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Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co.,63 the Second Circuit
upheld a trial court decision that use of the advertising jingle "I
Love New York" in a short television parody was fair.6 In a
brief footnote, the court expanded the conjure up test, stating
vaguely that a parody should "at least" be able to conjure up
the original so long as the parody "builds upon the original"
and "contribute[s] something new for humorous effect or
commentary. '65
The second case, Fisher v. Dees, involved an irreverent par-
ody of a popular Johnny Mathis love song.66 The Ninth Circuit
ended what had appeared to be a circuit split by adopting the
more lenient EZsmere conjure up test. Although the court
noted that a parody's commercial nature raises a presumption
against a finding of fair use,67 it nonetheless upheld the defend-
ant's parody, citing the limited taking involved6" and the lack of
economic harm to the copyright holders.6 9
Elsmere and Fisher have settled that parodists minimally
are entitled to conjure up the object of their humorous com-
mentary. But no court has offered a more precise definition of
what this loosened standard might mean. Thus for all practical
purposes, the conjure up test is undefined, too hazy to provide a
coherent decision making structure or to prevent inconsistency.
Moreover, the vague conjure up test may allow courts to mold
the outcome of parody cases to fit their preconceived notions
about what is humorous and what is reasonable.
63. 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), aff'g 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.),
cert denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1980).
64. The television program Saturday Night Live parodied the jingle as "I
Love Sodom," humorously depicting the biblical city of Sodom trying to spruce
up its image with tourists. The trial court found fair use after declaring that
the song did not affect the value of the copyrighted work. 482 F. Supp. at 747.
It also stressed that no more than necessary was taken. Id.
65. 623 F.2d at 253 n.1. The court maintained the traditional distinction
between productive and non-productive use the Supreme Court later rejected
in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). See
supra, note 38. A parody, however, may effectively criticize the original with-
out "building" on it. Imagine, for instance, an opera singer performing a Wag-
nerian aria famed for its heroic overtones. Through expressive gestures, voice
modulation, and humorous scenery and costumes she could comment critically
on the overly-melodramatic original while performing it verbatim.
66. 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986). The parody, "When Sonny Sniffs Glue,"
humorously satirized the 1950's standard "When Sunny Gets Blue." Id. at 434.
67. Id at 437.
68. Id. at 434 (noting that the parody was only 29 seconds long).
69. Id at 438 (finding that the parody was unlikely to fulfill demand for
the original).
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B. THE COMMERCIAL NATURE OF THE USE
A parodist's financial motives have long played a role in
determining whether a parody is fair use.70 Courts, however,
have been unable to define with any consistency what consti-
tutes a commercially-motivated parody, or what weight they
should afford commercial motives.71 In addition, courts often
equate "commercial" taking with bad faith,72 treating imagina-
tive, socially valuable work as chiselling for profit.7
3
Several recent cases illustrate continued confusion regard-
ing the commercial/nonprofit distinction. Original Appalach-
ian Artworks, v. Topps Chewing Gum 74 involved a Topps
parody that profited from the Cabbage Patch Dolls craze. The
court held that stickers featuring "The Garbage Pail Kids,"
Cabbage-Patch-like characters depicted in "rude, violent and
frequently noxious settings"75 were not valid parody36 Instead,
the court found the stickers a "bad faith" attempt to capitalize
70. See, e.g., Laew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165,
182-83 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd sub nom., Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th
Cir. 1956), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
71. The Loew's trial court, for example, indicated that parody motivated
wholly or in part by personal gain cannot be fair use. 131 F. Supp. at 176.
Courts have applied this rule sporadically to deny the fair use defense. While
such a result may seem instinctively reasonable when the parodist and author
are in competition because the parody could harm the original's market, courts
largely have failed to evaluate commerciality in light of economic considera-
tions. See, e.g., New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music Group, 693 F.
Supp. 1517 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), where defendants released "Nightmare on My
Street," a rap music video based on the popular Nightmare on Elm Street mov-
ies. The defendants released the video to coincide with the opening of one of
the plaintiff's films and to compete directly with the plaintiff's authorized rap
song and accompanying promotional video "Are You Ready for Freddy?". Id.
at 1518-21.
The New Line Cinema court was almost certainly correct in concluding
that "Nightmare on My Street" and "Are You Ready for Freddy" were in com-
petition. Other courts have reached the same determination with little more
than conclusory analysis. See, e.g., MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir.
1981). Still other courts view commercial parodies harshly, and often deny fair
use by refusing to admit that profit-motivated satires are parodies at all. See,
e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
72. One happy exception is Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986).
The court refused to find bad faith where the defendants made an admittedly
commercial parody without permission after the plaintiffs refused to license
the original's use. Id. at 436-37.
73. See, e.g., Original Appalachian Artworks v. Topps Chewing Gum, 642
F. Supp. 1031, 1036 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
74. 642 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
75. Id. at 1032.
76. Id. at 1036-37.
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off Appalachian Artworks' ideas.77
Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co.,78 concerned a
television commercial for Miller Beer in which comedian Joe
Piscopo and several others imitated a popular rap group.79 The
court rejected Miller Brewing Company's argument that the
advertisement was a parody, and reiterated the reasoning used
in Original Appalachian Artworks. Holding that the commer-
cial infringed on Tin Pan Apple's copyright, the court declared
that appropriation of material "to promote the sale of commer-
cial products" is not parody, and therefore not fair use.80
The Tin Pan Apple and Original Appalachian Artworks
courts went further than the Supreme Court did in Sony and
Harper & Row. Instead of stating that there is a presumption
against fair use when an appropriation is commercially moti-
vated, the New York and Georgia district courts indicated that
a profit motive precludes a finding of fair use. This restrictive
approach, which in effect equates profit motive with bad faith
appropriation, punishes parodists unnecessarily. More impor-
tantly, it ignores the important question of whether the parody
harmed the author's economic interests.
C. JuDIcIAL DISAPPROVAL OF CONTENT AS A DETERMINANT
OF FAIR USE
The most disturbing factor in parody cases is the tendency
of courts to consider a parody's content in determining fair use.
In effect, outraged courts punish distasteful or profane parodies
without reasoned consideration of the fair use defense or the
social goals of copyright. Moreover, courts denying the fair use
defense often protect the copyright holder's reputation, an in-
terest outside the scope of copyright law.8' The overly-flexible
77. The use was in bad faith, the court declared, because Topps "appropri-
ated plaintiff's copyrighted products for its own commercial gain." Id. at 1036.
The court indicated that Topps should have purchased the rights to the Cab-
bage Patch characters. Id. Given the plaintiff's efforts to create a wholesome
product, id. at 1035, it is unlikely that the plaintiff would ever have authorized
Topps to sell Garbage Pail Kids.
78. 737 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
79. Id. Piscopo appeared in a costume that made him appear to be a mem-
ber of The Fat Boys, and performed music in The Fat Boys style. Id. at 827.
80. Id. at 829-31.
81. The Loew's court's palpable disdain for what it termed the "low comic
vein" of Benny's parody, for instance, may have significantly affected the out-
come of that case. Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 131 F. Supp.
165, 168 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd sub nom., Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532
(9th Cir. 1956), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 356 U.S. 43
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nature of fair use exacerbates these tendencies. Because the
doctrine is amorphous, a court easily can conceal a content-
based reason for denying the defense by placing excessive
weight on one factor or another, or, as they do when confronted
with commercial parodies, by denying that the work is a parody
at all.82
MCA, Inc. v. Wilson8 3 and DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited
Monkey Business,84 both involving off-color parodies, indicate
the role that judicial disapproval plays in fair use. MCA in-
volved a take-off of the song "Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy" per-
formed in the cabaret show Let My People Come-A Sexual
Musical.8 5 Holding that the song infringed MCA's copyright,
the court assumed, without more, that, because the works were
both in "the entertainment field," they were in direct competi-
tion.86 Because of this competition, the court reasoned, the par-
(1958). The Ninth Circuit apparently shared the trial court's distaste, dis-
missing Benny's claim that "Autolight" was a critical comment on the original
as "a parody on the meaning of criticism." 239 F.2d at 537.
82. Applying an exceedingly narrow definition of "parody" is another way
courts express disapproval of the content of a parody. See Walt Disney Prods.
v. Mature Picture Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Holding that re-
petitive use of the "Mickey Mouse March" in The Life and Times of the Happy
Hooker was not fair, the court noted that the defendants did not attempt to
parody the song itself, but life in general. Id. at 1398. Placing a work in an
incongruous setting that exposes it as flawed or inane is parody, however, and
courts should treat it as such.
A Ninth Circuit case, Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979), also demonstrates the unspo-
ken role that content plays in parody cases. Defendant Air Pirates published
two "counter-culture" comic books depicting familiar Walt Disney characters
taking drugs and engaging in promiscuous sex. Id at 752-53. The court held
that the comic books infringed Disney's copyright. Id. at 758. The Air Pirates
court, like those before it, devoted considerable attention to the substantiality
of the appropriation under the conjure up test. Emphasizing the value of the
wholesome Disney image, the court denied the fair use defense even though it
admitted that Disney could not show that it had suffered economic harm. Id.
at 756-58. In fact, the court rejected the suggestion that economic harm to the
plaintiff's copyright should even be a factor in decision making. Id. at 756.
The Air Pirates decision can only be understood as a veiled attempt by the
court to punish a parody it found morally reprehensible. Despite no indication
that the comic books harmed the originals, the court enjoined their distribu-
tion. In doing so, the court vindicated damage to Disney's reputation, protec-
tion copyright does not provide.
83. 425 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y 1976), aff'd, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981).
84. 598 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
85. 677 F.2d at 182. The parody, "The Cunnilingus Champion of Company
C," clearly evoked the original in its title. Judge Mansfield notes in his vigor-
ous dissent that, beyond this, the lyrics of the songs were almost entirely dif-
ferent. Id. at 188.
86. Id. at 185.
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ody harmed the market for the original.8 7  Moreover, it
determined that the defendants had appropriated more than
permitted under the conjure up test.88 The real reason for the
MCA decision, however, almost certainly was the court's in-
tense disapproval of the parody, which it dismissed as "dirty
lyrics."8
9
Similarly, DC Comics concerned "Super Stud" and "Won-
der Wench," off-color parodies of Superman and Wonder Wo-
man used to deliver "adult" singing telegrams.90 Declaring that
courts will protect parody only when it creates something new,
not when it "destroy[s] the old," the court granted an injunc-
tion preventing the defendants from using or licensing the use
of the characters. 91
Considering potential effect on the copyright's value, the
court divided its analysis into two parts. It first found commer-
cial substitution because the defendants' parodies might pre-
vent DC Comics from creating or licensing its own singing
telegrams. 92 The court then considered "the implicit disparage-
ment and bawdy associations" resulting from the parodies.9 3
Emphasizing the all-American nature of the familiar charac-
ters, the court concluded that the parodies "tarnished" the
87. I& The court began with the premise that the two works were in
competition. Id- It then concluded that, because of the competition, "Cunni-
lingus Champion" harmed the market for "Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy," empha-
sizing that both the parody and the original were performed publicly, sold as
sheet music and on albums. Id
88. Id.
89. Id The full quotation reveals the full depth of the court's ire: "We
are not prepared to hold that a commercial composer can plagiarize a competi-
tor's copyrighted song, substitute dirty lyrics of his own, perform it for com-
mercial gain, and then escape liability by calling the end result a parody or
satire on the mores of society." IH.
90. 598 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1984). Performers portrayed the characters
while delivering singing telegrams. Id- at 114. The defendants themselves li-
censed use of the characters through singing telegram franchises. Id at 112,
114.
91. I& at 119. The court also found that the parodies borrowed exten-
sively from the comic book characters and thus that the defendants had appro-
priated more than necessary to conjure up the originals. Id.
92. IH at 118. Given the court's elaboration of DC Comics' attempts to
maintain the good-will and wholesomeness associated with their products, its
assumption that DC Comics would ever license its own singing telegrams,
whether featuring "Super Stud" and "Wonder Wench" or the originals, is
questionable. Equally troubling is the court's failure to consider whether the
parody fulfilled demand for the original. It seems unlikely that a consumer
wanting a Superman singing telegram would be satisfied with one featuring
"Super Stud."
93. I&
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value of DC Comic's copyright.94 By considering economic
harm flowing from the critical effect, or content, of the parody,
the Unlimited Monkey Business court vindicated damage to the
plaintiff's reputation. This protection, however, is outside the
scope of copyright law and should not figure into the determi-
nation of fair use.
Courts have yet to develop a suitable framework for ana-
lyzing parodies under the fair use doctrine. Although recogniz-
ing parody's social worth, they continue to evaluate satires
under the traditional four-pronged fair use test, without consid-
ering those prongs in light of copyright's underlying social
goals. Several recent cases demonstrate that courts are willing
to consider the economic effect of a parody on the original in
determining fair use. At the same time, however, courts still
devote considerable attention to the substantiality of the taking
under the conjure up test. They also continue to emphasize
such disparate elements as the commercial use of the parody,
the good faith or reasonableness of the parodist and, explicitly
or not, disapproval of the parody's content. At best, the results
are inconsistent. At worst,95 inconsistency degenerates into ju-
dicial censorship.
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING PARODIES
The Supreme Court decisions in Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios and Harper & Row, Publishers v. Na-
tion Enterprises demonstrate the Court's conviction that copy-
right is fundamentally a utilitarian system encouraging the
dissemination of knowledge through limited private monopo-
lies.96 Both cases stand for the proposition that commercial
94. Id. As in many parody cases, DC Comics alleged both copyright and
trademark infringement claims in Unlimited Monkey Business. Id. at 112.
Tarnishment is a trademark infringement claim involving use of another's
trademark in a setting which "tarnishes" it by creating unwholesome or nega-
tive associations in consumers' minds. See Original Appalachian Artworks v.
Topps Chewing Gum, 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1039-40 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Coca-Cola Co.
v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1189-92 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); see also L.L.
Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating that First
Amendment precludes application of state's trademark tarnishment statute
because defendant's obscene parody was a form of social commentary), appeal
dismissed, cert denied, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987); Arlen W. Langvardt, Protected
Marks and Protected Speech: Establishing the First Amendment Boundaries in
Trademark Parody Cases, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1, 35-39 (1991). Tarnishment is
merely another form of reputation damage and has no place in copyright law.
95. As in MCA and Unlimited Monkey Business.
96. See supra Part I.C.
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uses of copyrighted material are presumptively unfair. The
Sony Court, however, left "commercial" undefined, and the
Harper & Row Court broadly defined commercial uses as those
in which the user does not pay "the customary price" for
exploitation.
Sony and Harper & Row, however, are not parody cases
and they contain dicta that, if applied to parody, would sharply
curtail the fair use defense. Read together, these decisions
would drastically constrict the borders of the fair use doctrine
in the context of parody. Nearly every parody is "commercial"
under the Court's Harper & Row definition of the term, if for
no other reason than that the parodist has not paid the author
royalties for use of a work. Yet parody, functioning as humor-
ous criticism and commentary, serves valuable social functions
and should be encouraged. Sony and Harper & Row, therefore,
provide an inadequate framework for parody analysis. A more
appropriate framework starts with copyright's underlying ra-
tionale, acknowledged by the Sony and Harper & Row courts,
but adequately protects the diverging interests of parodists, au-
thors and the public. Such a paradigm balances all parties' in-
terests, while protecting parody's critical function.
A. THE EFFECT OF THE USE: THE "SUBSTITUTION TEST"
Copyright fulfills its social purpose through limited monop-
olies that encourage authors to disseminate their work. Uses
that harm an author economically are disincentives that sub-
vert copyright's goals. Fair uses are those which, although
technically infringing, do not damage the underlying incentive
system. Therefore, in evaluating whether a parody is fair use,
courts must look to the potential economic harm it may cause
the original author.
A parody that interferes excessively with an author's in-
centives to create and disseminate her work subverts the copy-
right system and does not merit the fair use defense. Every fair
use, however, necessarily involves some limited loss to the
copyright holder. At the very least, the author has lost the op-
portunity to extract royalties from the parodist.9 7  Courts
therefore must proceed with caution when evaluating harm to
an author. Rather than denying fair use when the plaintiff
makes any showing of negative market effect, the actual or po-
97. She also has lost the opportunity to create and market the parody her-
self. See infra Part III.E.1.
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tential harm must be great enough to require the protection of
the author and of the incentive system.
1. Market Substitution
Courts currently use two standards to evaluate the eco-
nomic harm a parody causes. While solicitous of authors,
neither approach sufficiently protects the parodist. One stan-
dard involves an inquiry into competition between the original
and the parody. This may be merely a conclusory analysis be-
cause the court, consciously or not, inserts its own opinion
about the parody's social value. The MCA court, for instance,
found that vague "competition in the marketplace" was suffi-
cient indication of economic harm to enjoin production of a par-
ody.98 The other standard focuses on the parody's adverse
effect on the original's market value.9 9 A test measuring nega-
tive effect on the original's market provides a better balance be-
cause it goes to copyright's underlying rationale. It is still
deficient, however, because it allows courts to consider adverse
impact from any and all sources, including economic loss and
reputational damage from a biting or unwholesome parody.
These types of harm flow from the content of the parody and
are not relevant to whether a use is fair.
As with all critical reviews, a caustic parody may decrease
demand for the original.10 0 Damage to reputation and the neg-
ative impact of a critical review, however, are outside the scope
of copyright protection.' 01 A market effect test based solely on
economic harm either must include these losses, or require
courts to separate non-actionable harm resulting from critical
impact from the harm competition between the works causes.
At best, this is a difficult and imprecise task. For these rea-
sons, the proper standard in analyzing market effect is not
whether any economic loss at all has occurred; instead, courts
should determine whether the parody serves or has the poten-
tial to serve as a substitute for the original or for its derivative
98. MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981); see supra notes
85-89 and accompanying text.
99. See Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1157-58
(M.D. Tenn. 1991); see also Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1070 (2d Cir.
1977).
100. Parodies, although humorous, fulfill the same critical function as seri-
ous reviews. In fact, a parody's critical effect may be its most valuable
function.
101. See Consumers Union of U.S. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044,
1050-51 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984).
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products.1 0 2 This "substitution test," used in conjunction with
the traditional four factor analysis in the Elsmere Music and
Fisher cases, requires more-than-negligible economic effect on
the original, thereby protecting the parody's valuable social
role. It also ensures that courts exclude a parody's critical ef-
fect from consideration. At the same time, it advances the aims
of copyright by protecting authors from excessive interference
with their property.
2. Fair Use Analysis Under the Market Substitution Test
If a parody is capable of substituting for the original or its
derivatives, the use is unfair. The parodist has appropriated
the author's work in a manner that contravenes the copyright
incentive system and courts need not engage in further analy-
sis. Although Sony may suggest otherwise, courts should not
attempt to weigh the social or literary worth of the parody
against the harm it causes the original. This type of balancing,
if properly done, arguably might further copyright's social aims
by classifying a parody as fair if its "value" outweighs the origi-
nal author's loss.1 0 3 Courts are not qualified, however, to make
such artistic and literary evaluations; nor would it be wise for
them to do so. Requiring courts to determine the societal value
of a parody would only increase the inconsistency already ram-
pant in parody case law. In addition, balancing the merits of
the original against those of the parody furnishes courts with
too much discretion. Such free-form balancing provides an un-
steady analytical framework and permits courts to weigh un-
spoken "factors" such as their own dislike of a parody.
The truest and most complex form of parodies, those that
simultaneously imitate and expose the flaws of the original,
will almost always be fair use under a market substitution test
because their critical function makes it unlikely that consumers
102. If the parody fulfills demand for the original, consumers would be
equally satisfied purchasing the parody or the original work. In deciding this
courts may examine a number of things, including, for instance, the number of
times the parody is reproduced. A one-time airing of a parody on a television
show would be unlikely to serve as a substitute for the original. See Elsmere
Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Corp. 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd
per curiam, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1980); supra
notes 63-65 and accompanying text. Whether the parody is in the same media
as the original may also be relevant.
103. The Supreme Court took this balancing approach in Sony, where the
majority agreed that the social utility of time-shifting outweighed harm to the
plaintiffs. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text. Some commentators
have advocated this approach. See Bernstein, supra note 45, at 38-44.
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would accept them as substitutes.10 4 This result is appropriate,
given the great value of such parodies as critical tools. Loosely-
based parodies, which borrow an original largely for humorous
effect and only obliquely comment on it,'05 often will be found
fair, but will run a greater risk of infringing because they are
more likely to substitute for the original.
B. USING THE CONJURE UP TEST AS A TOOL IN MARKET
SUBSTITUTION ANALYSIS
The amount a parodist copies from the original is largely
unrelated to the copyright incentive system, yet it continues to
receive an inordinate amount of judicial analysis. In focusing
on whether the amount copied is "too much," courts fail to con-
sider whether the parody harms the market for the original
work. In addition, by emphasizing the extent of the appropria-
tion, courts penalize the very parodists whose work is most val-
uable as criticism because it is the most thorough.1
06
Rather than affording the vague conjure up test a signifi-
cant role in their analysis, courts should recognize the test for
what it is: a rough rule of thumb that may aid in determining
whether a parody is a market substitute. The amount of taking
should not be a dispositive factor, yet at times it may be a use-
ful clue about a parody's effect on the original's market. A par-
ody that does no more than conjure up the original is unlikely
to be a satisfactory substitute in consumers' eyes; a parody that
closely tracks the original may satiate demand for the origi-
nal.10 7 In either case, the amount of the taking is only an indi-
104. Consider the bitingly satiric performance of the Wagnerian opera, dis-
cussed supra note 66. A Wagner aficionado would be unlikely to accept that
satire as an adequate substitute, even though the lyrics and music were identi-
cal. While parodies are unlikely to decrease demand for the original, they
might increase demand by stimulating interest in the original. See 3 NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra note 4, at § 13.05[C].
105. Such as the parodies in Berlin v. E.C. Publications, which were meant
to demonstrate "the idiotic world we live in." 329 F.2d 541, 543 (2d Cir. 1964).
106. The Air Pirates court imposed such a penalty. See supra note 82. The
court recognized that a parody that borrows more extensively from the origi-
nal may in fact be a more humorous and critical work, but held that there is
no right to make the "best" parody. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581
F.2d 751, 758 (9th Cir. 1978). If the ultimate purpose of copyright is to increase
the flow of information, however, courts should encourage parodists to create
the "best" parodies they can, limited only by the proviso that the parody can-
not serve as a substitute for the original and still be a fair use.
107. A satirical version of a mystery novel that reveals a surprise plot twist
might, for example, serve as an adequate substitute for the original.
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cation of the parody's effect on the original, not conclusive
evidence of infringement.
C. THE COMMERCIALITY/NONPROFIT DISTINCTION IN THE
PARODY CONTEXT
The Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises and
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios definitions of
commerciality are unsuitable in the context of parody. 0 8 Any
evaluation of a parody's commerciality is extraneous unless it
helps determine whether the parody is a market substitute for
the original. As with the conjure up test, the issue of a par-
ody's commercial or nonprofit status may inform the market
substitution analysis, but it should not be a determinative
factor.
1. The Inapplicability of Harper & Row
The Supreme Court indicated in Harper & Row that, in the
context of fair use, commerciality concerns whether the appro-
priation allowed the user to avoid paying the customary price
for the use.'0 9 This definition may help to identify unfair uses
of copyrighted material in ordinary business settings, but it is
inapplicable in the context of parody, where the creation also
exposes its subject to ridicule. Since a parody "garrot[s] the
original,"" 0 copyright holders will seldom permit parodists to
use their work."' Considering this, a definition of commercial-
ity that equates failure to pay with unfair use would condemn
nearly every parody.
2. The Traditional Commerciality/Nonprofit Distinction
The traditional commerciality test used in Sony examines
whether the appropriation is for profit in the everyday sense."1
2
It is, for several reasons, an unsuitable determinant of fair use
in parody cases. First, the test unrealistically defines the com-
merciality/nonprofit distinction in such a way that the two cat-
egories appear to be mutually exclusive." 3  The decision to
108. See supra Part I.C.
109. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
110. KAPLAN, supra note 7, at 69.
111. See Yen, supra note'45, at 104-08.
112. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
113. See 3 NIMIER & NIMMER, supra note 4, at § 13.05[A]; Salinger v. Ran-
dom House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 811 F.2d 90 (2d
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1988).
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assign a parody to one or another classification is largely arbi-
trary; commercial and noncommercial motives are likely to be
mixed together.114
Second, and more importantly, the test presumes that the
author and the parodist are in competition, and that the author
suffers an economic loss each time the parodist profits. 115 In
many types of infringement cases this might be a reasonable as-
sumption. Because a parody seldom competes directly with the
original for customers, however, the parodist's profit motivation
is largely irrelevant to fair use.
Rather than attempt to determine whether a parody is
commercial, courts should focus on the relevant question:
whether the parody is a market substitute. Unless the com-
mercial nature of a particular parody indicates in some way
that it is a potential substitute, the parodist's motivations
should not concern the court. Like the conjure up test, com-
merciality at times may be a useful rule of thumb. An aggres-
sively marketed parody, for example, may be a more likely
market substitute than one which is performed once for educa-
tional purposes. As with the conjure up test, however, judicial
consideration of the parodist's motives should be only the first
step in determining the likelihood of market substitution.
D. Two MODELS FOR COURTS TO FOLLOW
Two recent cases suggest that courts may be receptive to a
market-effect test. In Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolph Coors
Co.,116 the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
refused to enjoin Coors from airing a beer commercial parody-
ing the popular "Energizer Bunny" commercials. 117 The adver-
114. The parodist of a song, for instance, who releases her parody on an al-
bum may be motivated both by desire to communicate a message and to make
a profit. Courts routinely recognize such mixed motives in the First Amend-
ment context; this reasoning is equally applicable to parodies.
115. This is generally true in many areas of copyright law, including com-
puter software. When a competitor infringes upon the software of another
company, customers are in fact likely to choose one program at the expense of
another. Copyright infringement by a competitor is the paradigm in which the
commerciality/nonprofit distinction originated, and in which it continues to
perform a valuable function. A parodist is not, however, an author's competi-
tor in the ordinary sense of the word. Instead, a parodist functions more like a
critic or a commentator.
116. 765 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
117. The Bunny, a drum-toting wind-up toy, nonchalantly interrupts com-
mercials for fictional products. Interestingly, in this "commercial within a
commercial" format, Eveready itself parodies entire genres of television com-
mercials. The fictional commercials conjure up certain types of advertise-
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tisement, which starred actor Leslie Nielson sporting rabbit
ears and feet, was, the court found, a fair use. The court con-
sidered the lack of economic harm to Eveready dispositive, em-
phasizing that the parody did not satiate viewers' desire for the
original commercials.118 Citing Sony, the court noted that
Adolph Coors' commercial use actually weighed in Eveready's
favor,1 9 but refused to define the advertisement as strictly
commercial or noncommercial. The court recognized that par-
ody, even that created to sell a product, is rarely devoid of crea-
tivity.120 The Eveready decision demonstrates an encouraging
judicial willingness to look beyond the commercial/nonprofit
classification to a parody's market effect.
Despite the alarming number of cases that have turned on
damage to reputation or distasteful use, not all courts focus on
a parody's content. Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Productions'2 '
involved Screw Magazine's pornographic depiction of the famil-
iar Pillsbury doughboy, "Poppin Fresh." The court rejected
Pillsbury's argument that the parody's salacious nature entitled
it to less protection under the fair use doctrine, stating that it
was inappropriate for the court to consider the morality of the
use.122 Because it was unlikely that the parody had affected
the market for the original doughboy, the court held that the
use was fair. 23 Like Eveready, the Pillsbury court's emphasis
ments, including those for long-distance telephone services and sinus medicine.
Id at 442 n.3.
118. Id. at 448. If Eveready could demonstrate that the Coors commercial
made viewers less likely to watch the Energizer Bunny commercials, the use
would have been unfair. The Coors parody would have been a market substi-
tute for the original.
119. Id. at 447.
120. Id at 446-447 ("Although the primary purpose of most television com-
mercials... may be to increase product sales and thereby increase income, it is
not readily apparent that they are therefore devoid of any artistic merit or en-
tertainment value.").
121. 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
122. Id. at 131. Surprisingly, however, the court found that the parody,
while protected under the Copyright Law, violated Georgia's trademark anti-
dilution statute. Id at 135.
123. Id. at 130-32. Compare Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986), in
which the court rejected the argument that the distasteful nature of the glue-
sniffing mentioned humorously in the parody should play a role in determin-
ing fair use. Id at 437 (dictum). In Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F.
Supp. 1150 (M.D. Tenn. 1991), the copyright holders of the popular Roy
Orbison song "Oh Pretty Woman" sued rap group Two Live Crew over their
raucous parody of the tune. The court found the parody a fair use, rejecting
the plaintiffs' claim the parody "tarnished" the copyright. Id at 1158-59.
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on economic harm is encouraging, and should prove a model for
future decisions.
E. CHALLENGES TO A MARKET SUBSTITUTION TEST
The market substitution test faces two challenges. The
first of these is protecting an author's ability to exploit the mar-
ket for derivative works based on the copyrighted original. The
second is protecting parodists from liability for reputational
damage or tarnishment. In spite of these two hurdles, a fair
use test for parodies based on market substitution offers quali-
ties lacking in the current, ad hoc approach.
1. Market Substitution and Derivative Uses
A parody's effect on the market for derivative products
such as adaptations will be difficult for courts to evaluate be-
cause of the speculative nature of such products.124 Derivatives
and adaptations, however, may be extremely lucrative. Because
of the potential for financial gain that adaptations present, they
are a valuable part of the copyright incentive system that
courts should protect. Courts therefore should be vigilant in
preserving an author's opportunity to exploit the market for
adaptations and derivative works.
To do so, courts must distinguish between humorous adap-
tations of works and parodies. Humorous adaptations are de-
rivative works that copyright protects. Parodies, like
adaptations, by necessity borrow substantially from the origi-
nal. The crucial difference, however, is that parodies comment
in some fashion on the object of their satire. A parody may be
largely directed at lampooning societal mores, 125 but must in
some oblique way comment on the original or its special socie-
tal value is lost. If no critical function is fulfilled, the would-be
124. Parody itself is a derivative product, but courts should not find a par-
ody unfair because it might substitute for a potential parody the author could
create. To include a parody by the author as a derivative product for purposes
of determining market substitution would eviscerate the fair use defense. Au-
thors are entitled to comment critically upon their own works and this criti-
cism conceivably could be in the form of a parody. Because ridicule is one of
satire's intrinsic functions, however, it is unlikely that an author would in fact
denigrate her own work by parodying it.
125. The Mad Magazine lyrics of Berlin v. E.C. Publications, 329 F.2d 541
(2d Cir. 1964), are an example of a parody not focused directly on the original
work. As the Berlin court recognized, the songs parodied "the idiotic world
we live in today" and demonstrated the tameness of the original classics. I& at
543.
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parodist has usurped the author's right to adapt her work at a
profit, with no commensurate gain to society.
2. Tarnishment and Reputational Damage
Caustic parodies may wound egos and even diminish an au-
thor's reputation. Arguably, fear of derision prevents timid au-
thors from disseminating their works. This, however, is not the
type of disincentive courts should consider when evaluating fair
use. Copyright deals in economic incentives to create.
Wounded pride and reputational damage are not wrongs copy-
right remedies. Unless the parody is capable of serving as a
market substitute, the author must look elsewhere for a
remedy. 26
3. Advantages of the Market Substitution Test
Commentators have argued that creating a dispositive fac-
tor for fair use disregards the statutory language of 17 U.S.C.§ 107.127 This objection, however, ignores Congressional intent
in codifying the fair use doctrine. Congress meant to restate
fair use in 17 U.S.C. § 107, not to alter it.328 Courts are free to
adapt the fair use defense to suit their needs. As indicated by
the contradictory parody case law, adaptation is overdue.
Moreover, courts are qualified to make determinations about
market substitution, even in difficult cases involving derivative
works and adaptations. Such evaluations are no more specula-
tive than the conjure up test currently used.
Nor does a market substitution test make fair use analysis
overly rigid. The flexibility of 17 U.S.C. § 107 is helpful in
fields such as computer software, which undergo "rapid techno-
logical change[s]."1 29 That same flexibility, however, is detri-
mental in the context of parody, where the media used have
remained relatively stable but the case law has not. The "flexi-
126. Depending on the circumstances, other remedies may be available
under theories of defamation, invasion of privacy, unfair competition, the
rights of publicity and privacy and breach of contract. Plaintiffs may also em-
ploy the Lanham Act and state trademark disparagement and tarnishment
statutes to enjoin use of a parody satirizing a trademark as well as copyrighted
material. See, e.g., Pillsbury v. Milky Way Prods., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 24
(N.D. Ga. 1981); supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g., Clemmons, supra note 45.
128. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
129. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 22, at 66, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5680.
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bility" of fair use in parody cases leads to confusion and a possi-
ble stifling of parodists' creative efforts.
A fair use test that turns on market substitution would be
an improvement over the present ad hoc approach. First, and
perhaps most importantly, relying on one dispositive factor pro-
vides consistency, a quality sorely lacking in fair use analysis to
date. By relegating the arbitrary conjure up test and commer-
cial/nonprofit considerations to minor roles, courts can concen-
trate on whether a parody subverts the profit incentives
underlying American copyright law. Second, requiring market
substitution properly forces courts to disregard non-actionable
damage to reputation and wounded egos. Third, because the
market substitution test eliminates the amorphous calculus of
factors, there is less room for intrusive judicial "discretion"
concerning the content of parodies. While it is probably impos-
sible to eliminate completely the influence of personal taste, a
sturdier analytical framework forces courts to articulate their
reasoning more clearly. They are therefore more accountable.
CONCLUSION
The current judicial approach to the parody defense is
largely unrelated to copyright's policy goals. Rather than eval-
uate parodies in terms of their effect on copyright's incentive
system, courts examine a bewildering assortment of factors,
some of which are statutory, others unspoken. Nearly all are
subjective. Courts stifle socially valuable parody and subvert
the aims of copyright when they allow an author who has suf-
fered no economic harm to prevail. By focusing on the poten-
tial for market substitution, courts will be better able to
balance the interests of parodists, authors and society. At the
same time they will bring much-needed consistency to parody
case law.
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